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Attending to Equality: Criminal Law,
the Charter and Competitive Truths
Rosemary Cairns Way
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2001, Justice Rosalie Abella delivered a keynote address on the challenges of judging in the 21st century.1 Her remarks were
provocative, moving, aspirational and multidisciplinary, weaving music,
literature, contemporary culture, the media, history and current events
into reflections on the judicial task. Justice Abella succinctly captured the
social dynamic of the 1950s, writing: “The ‘truth’ was obvious, compliance was expected, and competitive truths and their adherents were
squelched.”2 Although written as part of Justice Abella’s “impressionistic
justice journey”3 through the late 20th century, her discussion of the
power of competitive truths resonated with my thinking about this essay.
This paper was presented as part of the 15th Annual Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference, a conference which this year marked the 30th
anniversary of the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.4 It was delivered as part of a panel entitled “The Justness of
Criminal Justice: How Has the Charter Changed the Problems We
Face?”, in which panellists were asked to “reflect on the social justice
issues raised in the criminal justice system and how those issues have
remained, changed or been redressed over the life of the Charter”. We
were charged with critically examining how our understanding and
response to crime has changed over the past 30 years. More specifically,
we were asked what, if anything, the Charter had to do with it. My
discussion is limited to the substantive criminal law of blame and
punishment. I will not be concentrating on jurisprudential details, but

1

131.

2

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa.
Rosalie Silberman Abella, “Judging in the 21st Century” (2001-2002) 25 Advocates’ Q.

Id., at 133.
Id., at 132.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
4
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rather on broad concepts. My analysis is impressionistic and personal,
and it reflects my commitments as a critical feminist and as an educator
of future criminal justice professionals. My argument is this. We need to
both seek out and pay more attention to the competitive truths about
criminal law. The most destabilizing competitive truth about criminal law
which has emerged over the last 30 years is that the criminal law raises
equality issues. The Charter has had something (but not much) to do with
that. In my view, the criminal justice system’s capacity to respond to
social justice issues will be enhanced when equality values are fully and
substantively incorporated into our “truths” about criminal law. And, as a
corollary, the failure to incorporate equality will hinder our attempts to
respond to the social justice challenges that permeate our criminal justice
system. To be clear, this is primarily a claim about the incorporation of
the equality value, a value which courts have repeatedly insisted should
be central to the development of the law,5 and not a claim about the
application of section 15 of the Charter.6 Incorporating equality requires
deliberate attention to perspective, context, power, vulnerability, presence and absence.7 It is difficult and it is complicated. But, as the
Canadian Judicial Council suggests in Ethical Principles for Judges, it is
“at the core of justice according to law”.8
5
In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130,
at para. 92 (S.C.C.), the Court concluded:
The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape
our democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts
to make such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it
comply with the values enunciated in the Charter.
See, generally, Peter Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Litigation” (2003) 20
S.C.L.R. (2d) 113.
6
Many commentators, advocates and activists are increasingly discouraged about the
complex and unsatisfactory evolution of s. 15 jurisprudence. See, generally, the collection of essays
in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham: ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006) and Fay Faraday,
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive
Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).
7
Rosemary Cairns Way, “Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating
Equality” (2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 27, at 33. See also Patricia Hughes, “Recognizing Substantive Equality
as a Foundational Constitutional Principle” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 5.
8
The Canadian Judicial Council, in its statement of Ethical Principles for Judges, identifies equality as one of its five basic principles, and counsels judges to “conduct themselves and
proceedings before them so as to assure equality according to law”. A commentary on equality
recognizes both the challenge and the centrality of the principle.
The Constitution and a variety of statutes enshrine a strong commitment to equality before and under the law and equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination.
This is not a commitment to identical treatment but rather “... to the equal worth and
human dignity of all persons” and ... “a desire to rectify and prevent discrimination
against particular groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society.”
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II. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
What are the social justice issues raised by the criminal justice system? In my view, everything about our criminal justice system is permeated with social justice implications. I understand the term social justice
to refer broadly to the relationship(s) between law and the issues which
face vulnerable communities.9 Social justice scholarship emphasizes
analysis and critique of the role of law in the development and maintenance of social, political and economic inequality, and encourages
reflection on law’s potential to be an instrument for social change. In
Canada, social justice scholarship is attentive to the needs of historically
marginalized groups including, inter alia, poor people, people challenged
by mental illness or addiction, Aboriginal peoples, members of ethnic,
religious and sexual minority communities, racialized individuals,
women, children and the undereducated. All of these groups are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, as accused persons, convicted
offenders, prison inmates, victims and witnesses, and, just as importantly,
as the family, neighbours and community of those listed above.10 One
Moreover, Canadian law recognizes that discrimination is concerned not only with intent,
but with effects. Quite apart from explicit constitutional and statutory guarantees, fair and
equal treatment has long been regarded as an essential attribute of justice. While its demands in particular situations are sometimes far from self evident, the law’s strong societal commitment places concern for equality at the core of justice according to law.
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges, online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/
general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf>, at 23-24. The five principles are judicial
independence, integrity, diligence, equality and impartiality.
9
This is the definition of social justice used by the social justice teaching group at the
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. See the Faculty of Common Law’s webpage on Law and
Social Justice, online: Faculty of Law, Common Law Section <http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=629&Itemid=161&pid=161&lang=en>.
10
Ontario, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), online: Legislative Assembly of Ontario
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/25005/185733.pdf>; David Tanovich, The Colour of
Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Public Safety Canada, Corrections
and Conditional Release Statistical Overview 2011, online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/
rep/2011-ccrso-eng.aspx> reports that 8.9 per cent of federal offenders are Black. This proportion
has been increasing for at least the last three years (2010 — Black offenders made up 7.9 per cent of
the population; 2009 – Black offenders made up 7.4 per cent of the population; 2008 — Black
offenders made up 6.9 per cent of the offender population). Statistics Canada reports that 2.2 per
cent of the Canadian population is Black. In other words, Black Canadians are overrepresented in
federal correction institutions by a factor of 4. Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepresentation Post-Gladue: A Realistic Assessment of How Social Change Occurs” (2008-2009) 54
Crim. L.Q., 447, at 451: “[T]he 2006/2007 ... figures from Statistics Canada show that Aboriginal
people make up 20 per cent of the jail population in provincial facilities, up from 16 per cent in
2001. Currently, over 1 in 5 inmates in federal and provincial jails are Aboriginal. For women,
almost one in three women in jail is Aboriginal. And the figures are even worse for youth.” Canada,
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator
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need only spend a day or two in a busy criminal courthouse to observe
what systemic and structural inequality look like in Canada. And one
need only glance at the annual reports prepared by the Office of the
Correctional Investigator to appreciate that our prisons are disproportionately occupied by those whose lives have been compromised by social
injustice.11 Consider, for example, the following snapshot of lived social
injustice, a profile of federally sentenced women extracted from the most
recent Report of the Correctional Investigator:
1.

In the last 10 years, the number of Aboriginal women in custody has
increased by 86.4 per cent, compared to 25.7 per cent over the same
period for Aboriginal men.

(2008-2009), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.aspx>: “Aboriginal
rates of incarceration are now almost nine times the national average”. Corrections Canada, Profile
of a Canadian Offender (January 2010), online: Correctional Service of Canada <http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/pblct/qf/pdf/07-eng.pdf> reported that: 13 per cent of male offenders and 24 per cent
of female offenders have very serious mental health problems on admission; there is a “prevalence”
of learning disabilities as well as offenders with low functioning capacities; 75 per cent of offenders
have a serious substance abuse problem; and a high rate of infectious diseases (7-10 times the
national average for HIV and 30 times the national average for Hepatitis C). See also with respect to
mental illness, the presentation of Howard Sapers, Correctional Investigator of Canada, Speaking
Notes (Appearance before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, May 25, 2009), at
7-9, online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/comm/sp-all/spall20090525-eng.aspx> and Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the
Office of the Correctional Investigator (2008-2009), at 2-6, 15, online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/
rpt/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.aspx>). See, as well, K. Roach & A. Bailey, “The Relevance of Fetal
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law from Investigation to Sentencing” (2009) 42
U.B.C. L. Rev. 1, at 11. Roach and Bailey cite studies which suggest that at least 10 per cent of the
carceral population suffers from some form of FASD, 10 times its presence in the general population
(at 8-9), and that half of the individuals suffering from FASD experience incarceration (at 9). See, as
well, the position paper of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, The Treatment of Mental Illness
in Correctional Institutions (November 2011), online: <http://publications.cpa-apc.org/media.php?
mid=1249>, which argues, inter alia, in Canadian Psychiatric Association, Media Communiqué,
“Psychiatrists urge government to address worsening mental health problems among inmates”
(December 7, 2011), online: <http://www.cpa-apc.org/media.php?mid=1664>:
The current situation is the result of poorly planned deinstitutionalization. Hospital bed
closures have been too rapid and too extensive. Community resources have been underfunded and limited. The result has been a fragmented healthcare system where no one has
taken responsibility for the care of one of the most disadvantaged and marginalized populations. Many people suffering from serious mental illnesses end up incarcerated in part
due to the lack of resources to treat them in the community, with the result that correctional facilities have become de facto psychiatric institutions. Access to care for many
only occurs after they have been criminalized. ... If the government does not include a
robust mental health strategy with its aggressive stance on justice policy, the mental
health crisis in our prisons will worsen. It’s time to stop using prisons as a parallel
healthcare system for people with mental illness.
11
See the wealth of information available online at the Office of the Correctional Investigator: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/index-eng.aspx>.
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Thirty-four per cent of the incarcerated women offender population
is Aboriginal.
In 2010, 86 per cent of women offenders reported histories of
physical abuse, and 68 per cent reported a history of sexual abuse at
some point in their lives, representing an increase of 19 per cent and
15 per cent respectively since 1991.
Approximately 45 per cent of women offenders reported having less
than a high school education at intake.
In 2009, 29 per cent of women offenders were identified at admission as presenting mental health problems, and this proportion has
more than doubled over the past decade.
Thirty-one per cent of women were identified, at intake, as having a
past mental health diagnosis, representing a 63 per cent increase
over the past decade.
Since 2003, at intake, approximately 77 per cent of women have
reported abusing both alcohol and drugs.
Just under one-half of women self-report having engaged in selfharming behaviour.12

These statistics provide painful evidence of what we know. We disproportionately incarcerate the marginalized, and the Charter seems to have
had little impact on our tendency to do so. The administration of criminal
justice in Canada is overflowing with social justice issues. As criminal
justice professionals, we have a public obligation to respond.

III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHARTER
Five years ago, Professor Roach argued that, despite its pervasiveness, and despite manifestly just results in a number of important cases,
the Charter was in fact of limited relevance to the justness of criminal
justice.13 In a wide-ranging discussion of significant criminal justice
issues, he offered what he described as “a sense of perspective”14 about
12
M. Barrett, K. Allenby & K. Taylor, Twenty Years Later: Revisiting the Task Force on
Federally Sentenced Women, Research Report 2010 No. R-222 (July 2010), online: Correctional
Service Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r222/r222-eng.shtml>; Public Safety
Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview: Annual Report 2010 (December
2010), online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2010-ccrso-eng.pdf>.
13
Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the Charter to the Justness of
Our Criminal Justice System?” [hereinafter “Roach”] in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds.,
The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada
2008) [hereinafter “Cameron & Stribopoulos”] 717, at 719.
14
Id., at 718.
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the relevance of the Charter and cautioned that the justness of criminal
justice might have more to do with Parliament than the courts. In my
view, this cautious assessment of the Charter’s impact reflects an
important truth of criminal justice. Criminal justice problems are inherently multi-dimensional. Solutions are necessarily multi-factorial and
often beyond the capacity of courts. It is naïve to assume that Charter
rights alone are capable of generating or sustaining the range of pragmatic, theoretical, political and systemic changes necessary to ameliorate
even some of what is unjust about criminal justice. But Charter rights are
not irrelevant. Their relevance and their potential depend on one’s views
about what might make the criminal justice system more just. Those
views will, of necessity, reflect subjective preferences about what counts
as justice and what a criminal justice system should achieve. In his recent
book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, William Stuntz
suggests that a decent criminal justice system must “produce justice,
avoid discrimination, protect those who most need the law’s protection,
keep crime in check, and maintain reasonable limits on criminal punishment.”15 For me, a “just” criminal justice system does all of those things
and does it in a way which is fair, humane and efficient. Its structure and
norms reflect Charter values, especially the values of equality and liberty.
It functions in a manner consistent with the kind of democracy described
by Dickson C.J.C. in Oakes,16 one which embodies:
[R]espect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs,
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups
in society.17

In approach it is deeply contextualized, recognizing, acknowledging and
reflecting the shifting social contexts in which it operates, as well as the
social and political particularity of the participants.
Acknowledging the social justice reality of the criminal justice system is both challenging and destabilizing. It is difficult to square the
liberal individualism which characterizes dominant theories of responsibility and blame, an individualism which is premised on individual
dignity, the capacity for choice, and formal equality of treatment, with
15
William Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2011), at 2.
16
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
17
Id., at 132 (S.C.R.).
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the systemic social and structural inequalities which characterize the
lives of those most likely to be caught up in the system. As Mark Kelman
trenchantly observed: “Pure-choice theorists must at least be quite
bothered by the disproportionate number of criminals who were victims
of racism, poverty, and unstable and abusing families ... we must wonder
about the meaningfulness of blaming those who we can so readily
understand.”18 More recently, Ben Berger, describing what he calls “the
gothic majesty of law’s independence from social inequality”,19 argues
that “we need our criminals to expiate our social sins of callous disregard
for social dislocation and deep societal inequality”20 and suggests that
recognizing the key role of social and political contributors to crime
“would complicate to the point of structural paralysis the question of
assigning guilt and responsibility”.21 I suspect he is right. The methodology of criminal law requires a narrowing time frame in order to focus on
individual blameworthiness.22 This time narrowing, although functionally
defensible, has the effect of rendering the systemic social and political
factors which contributed to the occurrence of criminalized harm,
invisible. It is hard to imagine an alternative system that could fully
incorporate the systemic contexts which inform human behaviour, while
at the same time responding to the personal victimization which the
criminal law seeks to legitimately name, denounce and deter. However,
in my view, the system’s ongoing legitimacy depends on our collective
willingness to acknowledge the tension between theory and reality. We
need to ask whether the inegalitarian impacts of the criminal law are the
necessary and inevitable collateral damage of a system whose central
organizing principle is individual responsibility.23 And, even if we
conclude that they are, we surely have an obligation to ensure that the
system does not unnecessarily exacerbate the unequal social contexts in
which it operates.
I argue that questions about the justness of criminal justice, and
about the Charter’s responsive and constitutive role with respect to
18
M. Kelman, “The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence” in D. Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982) 214, at 220.
19
Benjamin Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law” in
Francois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2012), at 118.
20
Id., at 119.
21
Id.
22
Mark Kelman, “Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law” (1980-1981)
33 Stan. L. Rev. 591.
23
Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to the Criminal Law, 2d
ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001), at 10-14.
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justness, turn, at least in part, upon the ways in which Charter analysis
potentially unearths, renders visible and potentiates criminal justice
responses to systemic inequality. In other words, has Charter analysis
encouraged the emergence of competitive truths which displace or
disrupt the often abstract, and sometimes complacent, individualism of
much criminal theory?24 Can we link those competitive truths to the
discourse of rights, or, at least to the discourse of Charter values? In what
follows, I will briefly examine two ways in which the Charter has had an
impact on how we conceptualize criminal justice issues, and suggest that
these shifts may allow us to respond more constructively to the social
justice issues which permeate the criminal law.

IV. COMPLICATING BLAME
The dominant narrative of the Supreme Court’s initial foray into constitutionalized fault is that the Court moved from “bold idealism” to
“cautious contextualism”,25 from a “burst of enthusiasm” to a period of
“consolidation” and “retrenchment”.26 In the Motor Vehicle Reference27
the Court did two things. First, it signalled its intention to take section 7
seriously by refusing to be constrained by a substance/procedure debate
which, in its view, had no relevance in the Canadian context. Second, the
Court jumped at the opportunity to follow the jurisprudential path
championed by Dickson J. in Sault Ste. Marie.28 What was previously a
matter of criminal law policy became a matter of constitutional entitlement, and the potential individualized unfairness of absolute liability
which concerned Dickson J. in the regulatory context was recast as a
denial of fundamental justice. Justice Wilson, in a compelling dissent,
focused on the combination of absolute liability and mandatory imprisonment.29 For her, fundamental justice was about more than “moral
innocence”, however defined. It was about the combination of automatic
imprisonment with absolute liability, a combination which in her view

24
25
26

lxiv.

Id., at 15-32.
Roach, supra, note 13, at 718.
Justice Marc Rosenberg, “Introduction” in Cameron & Stribopoulos, supra, note 13, at

27
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”].
28
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.).
29
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at para. 103.
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was both unreasonable, extravagant, disproportionate and incompatible
with the principle that punishment should be kept to a minimum.30
The decisions in R. v. Vaillancourt31 and R. v. Martineau32 took the
debate about moral innocence and applied it to an arguably anachronistic
murder provision. Moral innocence became, in the context of murder, a
constitutional requirement of subjective intention with respect to death.
Unwilling to moor its analysis in the simple fact of gross disproportionality between a mandatory life sentence and the wide spectrum of intentions captured by the felony murder rule, the Court articulated a test
dependent on stigma that became ultimately unmanageable, and which
led to constitutional analysis almost breathtaking in its circularity. Alan
Young has suggested that the principle of fundamental justice identified
in the Motor Vehicle Reference — the principle of no imprisonment
without fault — “may have been full of sound and fury signifying
nothing”.33 Jamie Cameron, who characterizes the constitutionalization
of mens rea as “no more than a modest success”34 suggests that while
both “Vaillancourt and Martineau raised the spectre of radical reforms to
the criminal law”,35 the Court was ultimately unprepared to engage in the
kinds of whole scale restructuring which a fully realized commitment to
subjectivism might have required. She writes:
[T]he constitutionalization of mens rea ended with Creighton and its
companion cases. Commentators saw wholesale retreat, if not an aboutface, in the post-Martineau decisions. ... To this day, it is a matter of
disappointment to some that the MVR’s promise remains largely
unfulfilled.36

My narrative of this story is different. In my view, the early stages of
constitutionalized fault represented the seamless merger of an evolving
common law commitment to subjectivism37 with the liberal individualism of the Court’s initial approach to the Charter. There are many reasons
that the Court adopted this stance, including a desire to distance itself
from Bill of Rights decisions, a need to forcefully respond to the legiti30

Id., at para. 128.
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.).
32
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
33
Alan Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content of
Criminal Law” in Cameron & Stribopoulos, supra, note 13, 441, at 482-83.
34
Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in Cameron & Stribopoulos, id., 553, at 569.
35
Id., at 563.
36
Id., at 569.
37
R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] S.C.J. No. 51, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.).
31
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macy critique, and a belief that the line between policy and law was
discernible. The problem, in my view, was that the Court’s claims about
the relationship between subjectivism and innocence were devoid of
political and normative context. The combination of eager idealism,
fondness for overarching conceptual coherence, and an uncompromising
commitment to subjectivism masked the complexity and context-specific
nature of assessments of blame. In the context of sexual assault, feminists had long argued that privileging subjectivism in fact immunized
male perspectives on sexual communication at the same time as it
ignored the gendered stereotypes which informed that perspective.38
Feminists also argued that entrenching subjectivism would dismantle the
doctrinal distinction between specific and general intent offences, a
distinction which, on the ground, seemed to benefit those most at risk
from being victimized by intoxicated sexual violence.
In 1992, I worried that we were moving inexorably towards an uncritical constitutionalization of subjectivism.39 I was wrong, of course.
Ironically, the constitutionalization of mens rea seems to have “stalled”
because the dramatic political and constitutional implications of entrenching a particular construct of blame became apparent, and the Court
dug in its heels. Although not articulated as such, I think that this
unwillingness reflected the Court’s eventual acknowledgement of the
complexity of blame. A competing truth about blame and responsibility
emerged. Different criminal harms occur in different social contexts. A
contextual, crime-by-crime approach to fault was more apt to respond
to these social context nuances than a one-size-fits-all commitment to
subjectivist theory. The post-Creighton40 fault decisions were a retrenchment from the expansive potential of the early cases, but they were
not regressive. Rather, they were a progressive and appropriate response
to the multi-dimensional interests affected by criminal law, interests
which the Court was beginning to take seriously.

38

See text infra and accompanying notes.
Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of
Fault” (1993) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128.
40
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
39
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V. RECOGNIZING EQUALITY
In my view, the constitutional ideal of equality is the most obvious
potential catalyst for the reconceptualization of criminal justice issues.41
Thirty years ago, the idea that the criminal law raised equality issues was
both unfamiliar and largely misunderstood. The dominant conception of
the criminal law was, for the most part, devoid of equality awareness and
binary in nature, with state power to name and punish criminal behaviour
counterbalanced by the classical liberal (freedom from) rights afforded
the individual accused. In the criminal law, judicial intervention on
behalf of the accused was likely to be seen as both rights-promoting and
costless, primarily because courts failed to acknowledge the rightsdenying potential associated with limiting state power as well as the antiegalitarian nature of a number of criminal law norms. Recognizing the
multi-dimensionality of the interests at stake in the criminal law renders
the relationship of the Charter, which protects both liberty and equality,
to the substantive criminal law exceedingly complex.
Christine Boyle put it succinctly almost 20 years ago. She argued
that equality had never been in the forefront of “thinking about the
overall burdens and benefits of criminal prohibitions”,42 and that courts
and lawyers preferred to characterize criminal law questions in terms of
fundamental justice, fair trial and privacy rights. She argued that “it is a
liberal illusion that equality concerns are effectively addressed by
considerations of power imbalances as between the state and the accused,”43 and insisted that the criminal law needed to pay attention to all
the other inequalities perpetuated, exacerbated and ignored by the
system.
The reconceptualization of sexual assault which culminated in the
1992 reforms offers a powerful example of the impact of equality.44 In
41
See Rosemary Cairns Way, “Culpability and the Equality Value: The Legacy of the Martineau Dissent” (2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 53 and “Incorporating Equality into the Substantive Criminal
Law: Inevitable or Impossible” (2005) 4 J.L & Equality 203.
42
Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in the Criminal Law” (1994) Sask. L. Rev. 203, at
207 [hereinafter “Boyle, ‘Equality’”].
43
Christine Boyle & John MacInnes, “Judging Sexual Assault Law against a Standard of
Equality” (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 341, at 346 [hereinafter “Boyle & MacInnes, ‘Judging Sexual
Assault’”].
44
There is a vast literature on sexual assault. An excellent collection of articles from that
era can be found in J.V. Roberts & R.M. Mohr, Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and
Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) [hereinafter “Roberts & Mohr”]. See,
also L. Vandervort, “Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea” (1988) 2 C.J.W.L.
233.
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my view, both the actual reframing of sexual assault law and the manner
in which it was achieved exemplify an operationalized commitment to
equality. The reform was the culmination of the concerted, unrelenting
and determined efforts of Canadian feminists. Two characteristics of that
movement were of particular legal significance. First was the explicit
recognition of the multi-dimensionality of the issues and the range of
rights claims which needed to be acknowledged and accommodated. This
recognition was manifested in the broad range of stakeholders who
participated in a consultative and deliberate re-imagining of how criminal law could work better.45 Second was the strategic use of the constitutional norm of equality. Feminists argued that sexual assault raised
equality issues. They argued convincingly that the crime was gendered,
that the way the offence was interpreted and enforced affected women’s
safety, access to justice and social equality, and insisted that the law
should not promote or rely on discriminatory stereotypes. To be clear, it
was not a case of displacing the familiar and critical values of liberty,
security and fair trial; rather, it was about ensuring that equality was part
of the mix. It makes a difference, as Professor Boyle pointed out in 1994,
how we describe the rights at issue in particular legal questions. It is only
when “all the relevant rights claims [are] on the table together”46 that
lawyers, law-makers and courts can carefully confront and give meaning
to the multiple and diverse interests at play in criminal law.
While the use of the equality norm in sexual assault law reform was
primarily directed towards the equality interests of victims, subsequent
cases have demonstrated that attentiveness to equality goes beyond socalled “victims’ rights”.47 Although not always (or even often) framed in
the language of equality, it is clear that courts have gone beyond a
45
Sheila McIntyre, “Redefining Reformism: The Consultations that Shaped Bill C-49”, in
Roberts & Mohr, id., at 293.
46
Boyle, “Equality”, supra, note 42, at 209.
47
Indeed, many critical feminists were deeply concerned about the risk that women’s equality claims would be appropriated in harsh and retributive justice responses. Scholars such as Dianne
Martin warned that:
[T]hat association — between taking crimes against women “seriously” and treating
offenders punitively — is a troubling consequence of feminist activism around the victimization of women: an activism that paralleled and propelled the emergence on the public/
political terrain of “victim” as a new status of citizenship and personhood.
(Dianne Martin, “Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform
Strategies” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 151, at 159.) In other words, the challenge, for critical
feminists, was to imagine ways in which the criminal law could be restructured in a manner which
was attentive to the equality rights of women and children without simultaneously ignoring the
equality claims of accused persons. See, more generally, Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’
Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
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simplistic equating of equality with victims’ rights, and towards a more
nuanced understanding of the complexity of rights claims which are
engaged by the criminal law. Appellate court policy on interventions
reflects an institutional commitment to multi-dimensionality. Consider,
for example, the case of R. v. Mabior,48 which was argued at the Supreme
Court in January 2012. The issue in Mabior is the relevance of viral load
to the disclosure obligations resting on HIV-positive accused.49 The
larger question is how the criminal law should respond to the evolving
social challenge of HIV/AIDS, a question that implicates both the liberty
and equality interests of sero-positive individuals, themselves a group
characterized by multiple and intersecting grounds of inequality, as well
as the liberty and equality interests of those potentially put at risk by a
failure to disclose. Interveners in Mabior include the Canadian
HIV/AIDS Legal Network, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, Positive
Living Society of British Columbia, the Black Coalition for AIDS
Prevention, the Canadian Aboriginal AIDS Network, L’institut national
de santé publique du Quebec and the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association.
I am convinced that the combination of attentiveness to multidimensionality and context, combined with a commitment to a constitutionalized equality value can reshape the ways in which we think about
much of the criminal law. Three recent cases offer examples. In R. v.
Tran,50 the Supreme Court considered the availability and scope of the
provocation defence in a factual context charged with equality dimensions. Justice Charron, speaking for the unanimous Court, concluded
that:
[T]he ordinary person standard must be informed by contemporary
norms of behaviour, including fundamental values such as the
commitment to equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. For example, it would be appropriate to ascribe to the
ordinary person relevant racial characteristics if the accused were the
recipient of a racial slur, but it would not be appropriate to ascribe to
the ordinary person the characteristic of being homophobic if the
accused were the recipient of a homosexual advance. Similarly, there
can be no place in this objective standard for antiquated beliefs such as
48

[2010] S.C.C.A. No. 492 (S.C.C.), granting leave to appeal R. v. Mabior, [2010] M.J. No.
308, 2010 MBCA 93 (Man. C.A.).
49
Obligations recognized in R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] S.C.J. No. 64, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371
(S.C.C.).
50
[2010] S.C.J. No. 58, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.).
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‘adultery is the highest invasion of property’ [reference omitted], nor
indeed for any form of killing based on such inappropriate
conceptualizations of ‘honour’.51

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,52 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a constitutional challenge to the sections of the Criminal
Code which “indirectly restrict the practice of prostitution by criminalizing various related activities”.53 The court struck down the “bawdy
house” provision pursuant to section 7 of the Charter and identified a
section 7 defect in the “living on the avails” provision which it cured by
reading in a phrase limiting the provision to “circumstances of exploitation”. The Court was divided on the constitutionality of the “communicating provision”, with the differences between the majority and minority
primarily reflecting a disagreement on the significance of the impact of
the provision on street prostitutes. Justice MacPherson, in dissent,
focuses on the particular and disproportionate vulnerability of street
prostitutes and holds that “the equality values underlying s. 15 of the
Charter require careful consideration of the adverse effects of the
provision on disadvantaged groups”.54 Relying on the decision of
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),55 MacPherson J. concludes that the section 7
analysis needs to take account of the pre-existing inequalities that
characterize the lives of the most vulnerable sex workers, whose experiences reflect multiple intersecting inequalities related to gender, race,
sexual orientation and disability.56

51
52
53
54
55

Id., at para. 34.
[2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”].
Id., at para. 2. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Id., at para. 356.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.). At para. 112, L’Heureux-Dubé J.

wrote:
Before turning to the analysis of the s. 7 rights implicated and the principles of fundamental justice, I would emphasize that this case also implicates issues of equality, guaranteed by s. 15 of the Charter. These equality interests should be considered in
interpreting the scope and content of the interpretation of the rights guaranteed by s. 7.
This Court has recognized the important influence of the equality guarantee on the other
rights in the Charter. ... All Charter rights strengthen and support each other [examples
omitted] and s. 15 plays a particularly important role in that process. The interpretive lens
of the equality guarantee should therefore influence the interpretation of other constitutional rights where applicable, and in my opinion, principles of equality, guaranteed by
both s. 15 and s. 28, are a significant influence on interpreting the scope of protection
offered by s. 7.
56
Bedford, supra, note 52, at 356.
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Finally, in R. v. Ipeelee,57 the Supreme Court engages in an extended
review of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and its decision in R. v.
Gladue.58 Ipeelee includes, in my view, a quite remarkable discussion of
how courts can respond to the existence of systemic discrimination
through the sentencing process. Justice LeBel writes:
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability
only follows from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find
themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack
of opportunities and limited options for positive development. While
this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say
that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of
criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances
may diminish their moral culpability. ... Failing to take these
circumstances into account would violate the fundamental principle of
sentencing — that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of
the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.59

Although LeBel J. does not use the word “equality”, the decision is
enriched by his attention to the “devastating intergenerational effects of
the collective experiences of Aboriginal peoples”,60 the ways in which
those effects have translated into “lower educational attainment, lower
incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and
suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration”,61 and the potential
disproportionate and adverse impact of apparently neutral sentencing
criteria in a context characterized by systemic inequality. The Court
concludes that a just sanction does not “operate in a discriminatory
manner”, and sentencing judges have an obligation to ensure that their
sentences are not contributing to, or exacerbating “ongoing systemic
racial discrimination”.62 In other words, sentencing judges need to attend
to equality.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
There is a certain irony in the fact that the social justice challenge
currently preoccupying criminal lawyers is the use of mandatory mini57
58
59
60
61
62

[2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Ipeelee, supra, note 57, at para. 73 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 60.
Id., at para. 67.
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mums, given the fact that mandatory minimums were at issue in the early
and foundational section 7 cases. In 2007, Professor Roach argued that
excessively retributivist criminal justice policies and increased reliance
on imprisonment through the use of mandatory minimums were impediments to the advancement of justice. He also predicted that “this policy
trend will in all likelihood not be restrained by the Charter and the
courts”.63 I think he may be wrong. The suggestion that the Charter may
be largely irrelevant to a criminal justice policy which will dramatically
exacerbate prison overcrowding, worsen prison conditions, distort the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, interfere with the practice of plea
bargaining, and have a disproportionate and discriminatory impact on
Aboriginal peoples, racialized individuals, the mentally ill, their families
and communities of support might lead one to decide, as Harry Arthurs
has powerfully argued, to “say no to the constitution”.64
I am not prepared to do that. I think that the ideologically driven and
evidence-disregarding imposition of mandatory minimums is vulnerable
to Charter challenge. Both R. v. Ipeelee and R. v. Smickle,65 in which
Molloy J. concluded that the three-year minimum in section 95(2) was,
on the facts before her, fundamentally unfair, outrageous, abhorrent,
intolerable and arbitrary, offer fodder for constitutional challenge.66 It is
not my intention here to analyze the ways in which mandatory minimums are constitutionally infirm. Rather, I want to suggest that our
constitutional analysis must be alive to equality, either as an interpretive
lens through which other rights are constructed, or as a stand-alone claim
about the discriminatory adverse impacts of mandatory minimums.
As my colleague Elizabeth Sheehy has noted, Canadian courts have
not yet been called upon to evaluate mandatory minimum sentencing
against equality standards.67 She offers a compelling argument that
mandatory minimums violate section 15 through their disparate impact
63

Roach, supra, note 13, at 720.
Harry Arthurs, “Constitutional Courage” (2003) McGill L.J. 1.
65
[2012] O.J. No. 612, 2012 ONSC 602 (Ont. S.C.J.).
66
See the articles in this volume by Allan Manson and Debra Parkes. See also Benjamin L.
Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort: The Politics of Minimum Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v.
Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101; Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of
Mandatory Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367.
67
Elizabeth Sheehy, “The Discriminatory Effects of Bill-C-15’s Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2010) 70 C.R. (6th) 302. For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of mandatory
minimum sentences on Aboriginal peoples, see Larry N. Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and
Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 449; Faizal R. Mirza, “Mandatory Minimum
Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491. See also the analysis by
Professor Chartrand in this volume.
64
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on Aboriginal peoples, other racialized groups and women, particularly
Aboriginal and racialized women. Unfortunately, when systemic equality
arguments are raised in courts, judges seem reluctant to adopt them,
particularly when the claims are based on the compounding and aggravating impact of limiting judicial discretion. In two recent cases, R. v.
Johnson68 and R. v. Nur,69 trial judges have faced these kinds of claims in
the context of the so-called “Truth in Sentencing Act” and the mandatory
minimum penalty in section 95(2) of the Criminal Code. In R. v. Johnson, Green J. concludes that “the impact of lengthier sentences will be
disproportionately absorbed by historically disadvantaged and vulnerable
groups, particularly Aboriginal and mentally ill offenders”.70 In addition,
he accepts that the “custodial sentencing disadvantage visited on those
detained in custody pending their trials as a consequence of the Bill C-25
amendments would only be compounded in the case of black persons as
they are more likely than members of other races to be denied bail.”71
Despite these conclusions, he finds no violation of section 15, concluding
that:
[T]he current demographic evidence relating to pre-trial custody
suggests that detention orders are correlated with considerations such as
attenuated community ties, unemployment and a history of prior
criminality. These factors may disproportionately characterize members
of the black and Aboriginal community, but they are present in all
racial and ethnic groups and are far from universal or defining features
of persons sharing either of the Applicant’s ancestries. Further, the
Applicant’s argument, logically pursued, renders much of criminal law
— or, at minimum, those statutory instruments bearing on penal
sanctions — vulnerable to s. 15 challenge on the same footing. This
hardly seems tenable.72

Similarly, in R. v. Nur, Code J. appears to accept the evidence that
62.1 per cent of the charges laid under section 95 between May 1, 2006
and October 31, 2010 involved Black accused, undoubtedly, in his
opinion, “a disproportionately high number”.73 And yet, he also concludes that there is no violation of section 15, concluding that the law
itself is not the cause of discriminatory impact:
68
69
70
71
72
73

[2011] O.J. No. 822, 2011 ONCJ 77 (Ont. C.J.).
[2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874 (Ont. S.C.J.).
R. v. Johnson, supra, note 68, at para. 94.
Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 130 (emphasis added).
R. v. Nur, supra, note 69, at para. 77.
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It is not difficult to establish that poverty, unemployment, poor housing
and weak family structures contribute to the proliferation of gang
culture and gun crime. It is also not difficult to establish that these
phenomena will attract heavy police attention and will lead to the
laying of large numbers of s. 95 charges. Finally, it is not difficult to
establish that anti-black discrimination undoubtedly contributes to
many of these underlying societal causes. However, none of this
establishes that s. 95 itself violates s. 15 of the Charter. ... The s. 15
arguments advanced by the Applicant and the Intervener could be made
in relation to any provision of the Criminal Code that results in
mandatory imprisonment, for example, the sentence for the offence of
murder. If disproportionate numbers of blacks are charged with murder
because of the discriminatory impact of poverty, unemployment, poor
housing and biased law enforcement decisions, would it be appropriate
to strike down the mandatory minimum penalty for murder? Obviously
not.74

These judgments reveal much about the challenges of making systemic inequality legally relevant to claims about the treatment of individual accused. They also reveal much about the poverty of our thinking
about equality. The challenge of identifying and taking seriously competitive truths is the challenge of being prepared to re-examine what
might be obvious, and what is, or might be, tenable. The Charter offers a
jurisprudential vehicle for that re-examination. The last 30 years of
decision-making in criminal justice has been characterized by an increasing willingness to address complexity and an increasing openness to
multiple voices. I think that both of those trends are consistent with a
commitment to operationalizing the equality value in the criminal law. I
want to conclude by suggesting three things. One, we need to take
account of equality in our conceptualization of the constitutional infirmities of, for example, mandatory minimums. Two, we need to name
inequality as one of the unconstitutional results of limiting judicial
discretion at the sentencing stage, discretion which in fact reflects
principles of substantive equality. Three, we need to be prepared to hear
from those who might offer competitive truths about the justness of our
justice system. Our democratic commitments to both social justice and
equality require it.

74

Id., at paras. 79-80.

